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ADVERSE INFERENCES IN
NLRB ADJUDICATION
In UAW v. NLRB' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, reversing and remanding the NLRB's dismissal
of an unfair labor practice complaint,2 ordered the NLRB to draw
an evidentiary adverse inference against the employer-respondent
based on his unexplained failure to produce records which might
have resolved the factual controversy before the Board. In 1963,
the UAW began an organizing campaign to unionize the Gyrodyne
Company of America. As the campaign gained strength, however,
the company began to discharge union-member employees. The
union sought redress before the NLRB, alleging that the employees
had been fired for their union activity in violation of section 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).8 Denying this charge,
the company contended that the employees had lost their jobs as
part of an overall cost-cutting campaign.4 In an attempt to refute
the cost-cutting defense during the preliminary hearing, the General
Counsel of the NLRB subpoenaed various company records which,
he alleged, would show that the discharged employees had been re-
placed. Despite the subpoena, hiring records were never produced;'
1. 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. Gyrodyne Co. of America, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1238
(1970) (supplemental decision), affg 170 N.L.R.B. 236 (1968).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1970). Section 8 provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization ....
4. The president of Gyrodyne indicated that he had instituted a general cost-
cutting program in response to letters from President Johnson and Defense Secre-
tary McNamara urging him to cut costs. 459 F.2d at 1333.
5. Neither the court opinion nor the NLRB opinions explain why the subpoena
was not enforced. Typically, if the person served with a subpoena does not comply,
neither the trial examiner, the Board, nor the NLRB Regional Director can compel
obedience; rather, the Board must petition the appropriate federal district court for
an order. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1970). The person who refuses to obey the sub-
poena is given notice and may appear in court to defend his non-compliance. If an
order directing compliance with the subpoena is issued by the court, subsequent
failure to comply may be punished as contempt of court. 1 B. WmENE, LAnOR RELA-
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the employer did, however, turn over other records dealing with the
discharges and gave oral testimony on the matter as well. The trial
examiner, finding the employer's testimony reliable and trustworthy,
attached no adverse inference to the failure to produce the hiring
records. The Board, in adopting the examiner's findings, drew no
adverse inference of its own from the non-production of the hiring
records, and dismissed the complaint.6 The union appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,' arguing
inter alia,8 that an adverse inference should have been drawn from
the failure to produce records. Although not agreeing entirely with
this contention, the court remanded the case for the Board alterna-
tively to explain its failure to draw the inference, to draw the infer-
ences and reconsider its decision, or to require production of the
recordsY In a supplemental decision, the NLRB affirmed its prior
decision to dismiss the complaint,'0 again refusing to attach an ad-
verse inference to the company's failure to produce all the hiring
records. The Board found that: (1) the employer's testimony was
reliable and trustworthy; (2) the missing subpoenaed materials
were not important; and (3) the personnel files, if produced, would
not necessarily establish that the discharges were reprisals for the
TIONS LAW & PRACTICE § 8.51 (1966). Compare FED. R. Ciy. P. 37 which pro-
vides sanctions for failure to make discovery. A party attempting to evade discovery
may be subjected to a variety of sanctions including an order (1) requiring that
certain facts be taken to be established, (2) refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, (3) dismissing all or part of the
action, (4) rendering a judgment by default, or (5) assessing posts and attorneys'
fees. If a deponent fails to be sworn in or to answer a question after being directed
to do so by the court, the failure may be considered a contempt of court. See
C. WRIGHT, I.Aw oF FEDERAL COURTs § 90 (2d ed. 1970).
The reason for the General Counsel's failure to avail himself of the opportunity
to secure judicial enforcement of the subpoena was, apparently, his reliance on the
statement of the trial examiner that "I will draw my own inferences from the re-
fusal" to produce the subpoenaed documents. Brief for Petitioner at 16, UAW v.
NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Another factor in the General Counsel's
failure to utilize the judicial enforcement procedure was apparently the fact that the
procedure is "extraordinarily time consuming." Id.
6. Gyrodyne Co. of America, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 236 (1968).
7. UAW v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
8. The union also argued that the refusal of the trial examiner to admit evi-
dence of Gyrodyne's behavior during another union campaign 18 months before was
prejudicial error. The court held that the trial examiner's decision was proper.
Id. at 687.
9. Id.




employees' union activity." The union, dissatisfied with the Board's
refusal to draw the inference, again sought review in the D.C. Cir-
cuit which reversed and remanded the action to the NLRB, order-
ing it to draw an adverse inference.
The adverse inference rule, a corollary to the general concept
of inferences, 12 provides that where a party fails to produce evi-
dence within his control which is relevant to an issue in controversy,
the trier of fact may infer that the evidence, if produced, would be
unfavorable to that party.'" The policy underlying the use of the
adverse inference rule is the achievement of an equitable decision
made on the basis of all relevant evidence. Upon the failure of a
party to produce pertinent evidence without adequate explanation,
the conclusion may be drawn that the withheld evidence is unfavora-
ble; therefore, the inference is permitted in order to prevent a recal-
citrant party from profiting by his own wrongdoing. The rule,
utilized as a rule of evidence in a variety of proceedings, is ordi-
narily viewed as discretionary in nature. 14  While the rule is also
11. 75 L.R.R.M. at 1239-40.
12. An inference is a proposition, deduction, or conclusion which reason and
logic lead the trier of fact to draw from established facts. See, e.g., State v. Jones,
39 N.M. 395, 401, 48 P.2d 403, 406 (1935) ("An inference is merely a logical
deduction from facts and evidence."); State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 274, 71
N.E.2d 258, 265 (1947) ("An 'inference' is a conclusion, which by means of data
founded upon common experience, natural reason draws from facts which are
proved."); Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wash. 2d 376, 393, 165 P.2d 95, 104 (1946) ("An
inference is a logical deduction or conclusion from an established fact.").
13. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939); P.R.
Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 1968); Maphis Chapman Corp.
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 1966); South, Inc. v. Moran Towing &
Transp. Co., 252 F. Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), af'd, 360 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1966). See 2 J. WiGMORE, TREATSE ON EVIDENCE § 285 (3d ed. 1940). See also
1 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 28 (5th ed. 1958).
An adverse inference may arise in a variety of circumstances: when a
party fails to call a witness, fails to take the stand as a witness himself, or fails to
produce as evidence writings or objects in his possession. C. McCoRMscI, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 272 (2d ed. 1972). The failure to produce evidence in defiance of a
subpoena would appear to be a strong reason for drawing the inference. See note
40 infra and accompanying text.
14. The permissive nature of the adverse inference rule has been indicated in
administrative law cases involving NLRB decisions. In NLRB v. Ford Radio &
Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958), the court, in denying enforcement of a
Board reinstatement order, discussed the value of the testimony of a policeman who
witnessed activity of discharged employees and communicated his findings to the em-
ployer. The court stated:
The contents of this communication were not brought out. However,
since proof of motivation of the employer was part of the General Coun-
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utilized by other administrative agencies,15 it is implicitly available
in NLRB proceedings which must be conducted, so far as practica-
ble, in accordance with the rules of evidence utilized in the federal
district courts. 6 Furthermore, the authority to draw any inferences
from the facts has been expressly placed by Congress exclusively in
the Board17 and has been affirmed in case law.'
sel's case, his refusal to elicit this readily available and crucial testimony of
a distinterested witness may well be taken to mean that the information
was adverse to his case. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
In NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952), business partners were ac-
cused of an unfair labor practice in closing their plant upon hearing that employees
were joining the union. The court indicated:
The trial examiner noted that respondents had failed to adduce evidence
as to their profit-loss position. This evidence was vital and it was clearly
within respondents' power to produce it. The Board would have been
warranted in drawing an inference that such evidence, if adduced, would
not have been favorable to respondents. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
In Crowe Gravel Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1967), the trial examiner held that
employees were discharged because of their union membership in violation of the
NLRA. In response to the employer's defense that the discharges were economically
motivated, the trial examiner indicated:
The failure to offer such evidence, [of the alleged change in the nature of
sales] especially when viewed in the light of the unreliability of [the em-
ployer's] testimony, permits the inference, which is made . . . . (em-
phasis added). Id. at 1047.
Cf. Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Ent-
wistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1941).
The permissive nature of the adverse inference rule has been indicated in civil
law cases as well. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298
(1934) ("justly may be inferred"); Bray v. United States, 306 F.2d 743, 747
(1967) ("jury is permitted but not compelled") (emphasis in original); United
States v. Roberson, 233 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1956) (failure to offer evidence
"may in a proper case be considered as a circumstance against him"); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Biancaniello, 183 F.2d 982, 985 (1950) ("permits the inference");
Austerberry v. United States, 169 F.2d 583, 593 (6th Cir. 1948) ("justified in con-
cluding"); Borkovic v. Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 495, 501 (W.D. Pa. 1960)
("the jury may infer"). See note 34 infra. See generally 1 B. JoNES, supra note 13,
§ 28; C. MCCORaMIcK, supra note 13, § 272; 2 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 13, § 285.
15. N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1961); Evis Mfg.
Co. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 831, 847 (9th Cir. 1961).
16. Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in ac-
cordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the
United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of
the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
17. "The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."
Id. § 160(e).
18. NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (1940) ("Congress entrusted
the Board, not the Courts with the power to draw inferences from the facts.');
NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461 (1940); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938); NLRB v. Sequoyah Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 606, 609
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When reviewing NLRB proceedings, courts are limited to de-
termining whether or not the agency decision rests upon substantial
evidence. 9 Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that when a court
reviews an order of the Board, [tihe findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 20  This sec-
tion has been construed to mean that a reviewing court must not dis-
place the Board's choice between two conflicting views, but can only
set aside a Board decision when
it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that deci-
sion is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its en-
tirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's
view. 21
Thus, an NLRB decision turning on evidentiary inferences is not al-
together immune from judicial review, but it may be overturned
only when a court determines that the findings of the agency with
respect to questions of fact are not supported by "substantial evi-
dence. ' 2   Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the courts have de-
nied enforcement to Board orders when the Board has relied on
circumstantial evidence that is not "substantial,"2 or has drawn in-
ferences deemed either "unreasonable"2 4 or "clearly in error. '2
Orders of the NLRB have occasionally been denied enforcement
when the trial examiner's drawing of inferences has been rejected by
the Board. 6
(10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Power Equip. Co., 313 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1963)
("As a reviewing court, we are not free to draw this latter inference, even though
we may think it the more logical and might do so were we hearing the case de
novo."); NLRB v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.
1950); NLRB v. Austin Co., 165 F.2d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 1947). See also 4 DAVIS
§ 29.05 (1958).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
20. Id.
21. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also
62 CoLUM. L. REV. 1330 (1962).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). See generally 4 DAVIS §§ 29.02, .05, .06
(1958).
23. NLRB v. Stafford, 206 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1953). See also Peoples Motor
Exp. v. NLRB, 165 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1948).
24. NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1954); Tampa
Times Co. v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1952).
25. United States Steel Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 1952). See
Cooper, Administrative Lav: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945,
949 (1958).
26. Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1970); Cain's Cof-
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There are, however, several countervailing factors which weigh
heavily in favor of affirming an agency decision concerning an ad-
verse inference. First, an administrative body which deals in a sin-
gle, specialized field is presumed to be more qualified to make find-
ings of fact within that area." Second, an agency decision is based
directly upon first-hand knowledge of a case, and often upon direct
contact with the parties involved;28 in contrast, both the first-hand
knowledge and contact are lacking when an appellate court views
the bare record. The third factor weighing in favor of affirming an
agency decision concerning an adverse inference is comity-the
practical principle of not encouraging undue judicial interference
with agencies and the administrative process. 29  In addition, al-
fee Co. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1968). See also NLRB v. Neuhoff
Bros. Packers, Inc., 398 F.2d 640, 644 (5th Cir. 1968).
Courts have also upheld the Board's rejection of the trial examiner's drawing of
inferences. NLRB v. Central Mach. & Tool Co., 424 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1970);
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rocky Mountain Natural Gas
Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1964).
In Brief for Petitioner at 10, UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
it was stated:
Indeed Board decisions have been set aside on review where the adverse
inference was not drawn. NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721,
727 (CA 6, 1943); NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 463
(CA 2, 1958); NLRB v. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co., 307 F.2d 374,
378 (CA 6, 1962); cf. NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Manu. Corp., 428 F.2d 217,
225-26 (CA 8, 1970).
A careful examination of these cases reveals, however, that in none of the cases
was the failure to draw the inference the cause for the setting aside of the Board
decision.
27. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 49 (1954); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIvE PROCEEDINGS 87 (1941); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69
Hnv. L. REv. 1020, 1038-40 (1956).
28. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951); American
Brake Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1957). In an unfair labor
practice proceeding, the trial examiner conducts the hearing on the complaint, rules
on motions and the admissibility of evidence, sees documentary evidence, and hears
the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. 1 B. WERNE, supra note 5,
§ 8.5.
The Board, in contrast, makes its findings, conclusion, and order on the basis
of the record, the trial examiner's decision and recommended order, the exceptions
to the trial examiner's decision and order, and the supporting briefs of the parties.
Id. § 8.7.
For discussion of the effect of disagreement between the Board and the trial
examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case, see Cooper,
supra note 25, at 1002.
29. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). See also
4 DArvs § 28.21 (1958).
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though courts have previously upheld the use of adverse inferences
drawn by triers of fact in agency proceedings'°--as well as in civil
casesl 1-and while the adverse inference rule has been applied by
the Board in cases factually similar to UAW v. NLRB, 2 no court
previous to UAW had compelled the agency to draw an adverse in-
ference. Finally, as the dissent points out,8 there is some authority
indicating that, at least in civil law cases, the failure of the finder of
fact to draw an adverse inference is discretionary and thus not an
error reviewable on appeal 8 4
In UAW v. NLRB,35 with one judge dissenting in part, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the
NLRB to draw an adverse inference from the employer's failure to
produce relevant evidence in an unfair labor practice proceeding.
The court also ordered that the company's cost-cutting defense be
stricken if subpoenaed hiring records were not produced within 30
30. Bradley v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 369 (D. Alaska, 1971); Smyth v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
31. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225-26 (1939); Glimco
v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 537, 540-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 981
(1968); Daniel v. United States, 234 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1956).
32. NLRB v. Drennon Food Prods. Co., 272 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1959); Welcome-
American Fertilizer Co., 169 N.L.P.B. 862 (1968).
33. 459 F.2d at 1349.
34. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Smith, 127 A.2d 556 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956).
In Aetna, a used car business operator brought an action against his insurer for
indemnification for loss of an automobile taken from him but failed to introduce
records to substantiate his claim as to the value of the automobile. The insurer
contended that the failure to produce records gave rise to a conclusive presumption
that the records were unfavorable to the operator. In affirming a judgment against
the insurer, the court stated that:
Assuming there was sufficient foundation for an unfavorable inference of
this kind, the fact that the trial court failed to draw the inference consti-
tutes no error reviewable on appeal. The inference arising from the re-fusal or unexplained failure to produce relevant documentary evidence is
permissive in nature, and is merely another factor which may be given
consideration by the trier of facts when weighing the evidence and deter-
mining the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
The court again noted:
The trial court could have drawn an unfavorable inference, but it was not
required to do so and apparently chose not to. Failure of the trier of
facts to draw an inference, permissible in nature, cannot be advanced to
an appellate court as a ground justifying reversal of the judgment. Id.
See also Gosch v. Gomez, 450 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1969), where the court, in af-
firming a judgment to dismiss a claim against an estate, stated:
It is the peculiar responsibility of the trial judge to determine what infer-
ences should be reasonably drawn from the evidence he hears, and the
drawing of or the refusal to draw inferences by a trial judge will not be
disturbed by us unless reasonable minds could not differ on the result.
Id. at 1017.
35. 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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days. 0  After setting out the adverse inference rule,87 the majority
opinion noted the propriety of utilizing the rule in this particular
fact situation. 8 The UAW majority, indicating that the reasons
for the Board's refusal to draw the inference were unsatisfactory and
irrational,39 noted that common sense alone would suggest that one
who defies a subpoena to produce records, absent a showing of ade-
quate justification, is withholding adverse evidence from the trier
of fact.40 However, although the court cited case precedent to indi-
cate that judicial intervention is necessary and proper to insure a
"fair hearing,"41 the majority opinion not only failed to cite spe-
cific authority for ordering an adverse inference drawn, but also
failed adequately to refute the contention that an adverse inference
was a discretionary device.4" Buttressing its decision to order the
drawing of the inference by noting that nothing would be gained by
further remand43 and that the case had already been held up in
seven years of litigation,44 the court commented summarily that it
is sometimes necessary for a reviewing court to "take direct action"
in response to irrational or arbitrary administrative conduct.45
UAW v. NLRB is both significant and troublesome. As noted,
the UAW court is apparently the first court to have expressly and
affirmatively ordered the NLRB to draw an adverse inference. In
so doing, the court did not effectively come to grips with the es-
36. Id. at 1347-48. It should be noted that the orders could, depending upon
the employer's subsequent actions, be conflicting. If the records are produced,
it would be unnecessary to draw an inference.
37. Id. at 1335-36.
38. Id. at 1340-42.
39. Id. at 1341 ("reasons. . .range from unconvincing to trivial"); id. at 1342
("none of these reasons will withstand even cursory analysis"); id. at 1346 ("is sup-
ported by no reason"); id. ("administrative agencies are not authorized to act arbi-
trarily and capriciously and that they, unlike juries, are required to give rational rea-
sons for their decisions").
40. Id. at 1338.
41. Id. at 1341.
42. After noting the Board's argument that the adverse inference was "permis-
sive only," the court cited its prior opinion in the case, 419 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir.
1969), as implicitly holding that the rule was not permissive. (In that opinion, the
court remanded to the Board for an explanation of why the inference was not
drawn.) The court went on to say that "Emlore fundamentally," an administrative
agency must not act arbitrarily and must give rational reasons for its decisions.
Id. at 1346. This would seem to be, at best, a bootstrap argument.
43. Id. at 1347.
44. Id. at 1348.
45. Id. at 1347.
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tablished view that an adverse inference is permissive and the draw-
ing of inferences is within the discretion of the NLRB, not the
courts. In, apparent disregard of the usual rule that a trial exami-
ner's findings accepted by the Board concerning the credibility of
witnesses is to be especially respected,46 the UAW majority cur-
sorily rejected the agency's determination that the employer's testi-
mony was trustworthy and reliable. Since the trial examiner ac-
cepted the employer's testimony and the Board adopted the exami-
ner's proposed opinion,4 7 the Board's determination on the matter
of credibility should not have been so lightly disregarded. 4  Never-
theless, the court of appeals' decision reversing the NLRB and or-
dering the adverse inference may be regarded as correct, since the
majority opinion effectively rebutted the generally unsatisfactory rea-
soning utilized by the Board in determining not to draw the infer-
ence. Basing its refusal to draw the adverse inference primarily on
the credibility of the employer,49 the Board had lent little weight to
the fact that it was the same employer who defied an administrative
subpoena to produce the records about which he testified. The
failure of the employer to produce relevant records in defiance of a
subpoena and without explanation would seem sufficient in and of
itself to warrant the use of an adverse inference. The question
which remains, however, is whether UAW is simply an isolated in-
stance of a court straining to reach an equitable decision in an un-
usual and limited factual setting.5° If it is not, the enunciation of
46. NLRB v. Bendix Corp., 299 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Marcus
Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. C. Malone Trucking, Inc.,
278 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1960). But see NLRB v. Mt. Vernon Tel. Corp., 352 F.2d
977 (6th Cir. 1965). See also note 28 supra.
47. Gyrodyne Co. of America, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1238
(1970) (supplemental decision).
48. In NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1952), the court
of appeals commented:
we surely may not upset the Board when it accepts a finding of an Exami-
ner which is grounded upon . . . [the] Examiner's evaluation of oral
testimony as reliable, unless on its face it is hopelessly incredible .
See generally Jaffe, supra note 27. For insight into the relationship between the
trial examiner and the NLRB, see 1 B. WERNF, supra note 5, § 8.7; M. MANOFF,
LABOR RELATIONS LAw 136-37 (3d ed. 1958). See also note 28 supra.
49. Gyrodyne Co. of America, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1238,
1239 (1970) (supplemental decision).
50. The case had been in court for seven years. In commenting on this delay,
Judge Wright, speaking for the majority, commented caustically:
Once in a great while, a case comes before this court which makes one
wonder whether the judicial system is still equipped to deal with a litigant
determined to frustrate the workings of justice. Unfortunately, this is such
a case. . . . The time has come to stop Gyrodyne from accruing interest
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more specific guidelines for affirmatively requiring administrative
agencies to draw adverse inferences is essential in order to avoid en-
croachment, by the judiciary, upon the agency fact-finding function
and, ultimately, erosion of the agencies' decision-making authority.
on its investment in intransigence. 459 F.2d at 1332.
Judge Wright also indicated that the decision was "motivated in part by the need to
bring the seemingly endless years of litigation surrounding this case to a rapid con-
clusion." Id. at 1347.
